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Abstract
Adversarial attack has inspired great interest in com-
puter vision, by showing that classification-based solutions
are prone to imperceptible attack in many tasks. In this pa-
per, we propose a method, SMART, to attack action rec-
ognizers which rely on 3D skeletal motions. Our method
involves an innovative perceptual loss which ensures the im-
perceptibility of the attack. Empirical studies demonstrate
that SMART is effective in both white-box and black-box
scenarios. Its generalizability is evidenced on a variety of
action recognizers and datasets. Its versatility is shown in
different attacking strategies. Its deceitfulness is proven in
extensive perceptual studies. Finally, SMART shows that
adversarial attack on 3D skeletal motion, one type of time-
series data, is significantly different from traditional adver-
sarial attack problems.
1. Introduction
Adversarial attack has invoked a new wave of research
interest recently. On the one hand, it shows that deep learn-
ing models, as powerful as they are, are vulnerable to at-
tack, leading to security and safety concerns [29]; on the
other hand, it has been proven to be useful in improving
the robustness of existing models [14]. Starting from ob-
ject recognition, the list of target tasks for adversarial attack
has been rapidly expanding, now including face recognition
[25], point clouds [38], and 3D meshes [40].
While adversarial attack on static data (images, geome-
tries, etc.) has been explored, its effectiveness on time-
series has only been attempted under general settings [9].
In computer vision, video-based attack has been attempted
in attacking recognition tasks [36]. In this paper, we would
like to attack another type of time-series data: 3D skeletal
motions, for action recognition tasks.
Skeletal motion has been widely used in action recogni-
tion [3]. It can greatly improve recognition accuracy by mit-
igating issues such as lighting, occlusion and posture ambi-
guity. In this paper we show that 3D skeletal motions are
also vulnerable to adversarial attack and it can thus cause
serious concerns.
Adversarial attack on 3D skeletal motion faces two
unique and related challenges which are significantly dif-
ferent from other attack problems: low redundancy and per-
ceptual sensitivity. When attacking images/videos, it is pos-
sible to perturb some pixels without causing too much vi-
sual distortion. This largely depends on the redundancy in
image space [31]. Unlike images, which have thousands of
Degrees of Freedom (DoFs), a motion frame (or a pose) in
3D skeletal motions is usually parameterized by fewer than
100 DoFs (in our experiments, we use 25 joints, equiva-
lent to 25*3=75 DoFs). This not only restricts the space of
possible attacks, but also has severe consequences on the
imperceptibility of the adversarial examples: a small per-
turbation on a single joint can be easily noticed. Further-
more, coordinated perturbations on multiple joints in only
one frame can hardly work either, because in the temporal
domain, similar constraints apply. Any sparsity-based per-
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turbation (on single joints or individual frames) will greatly
affect the dynamics (causing jittering or bone-length viola-
tions) and will be very obvious to an observer.
We propose an adversarial attack method, SMART,
based on an optimization framework that explicitly consid-
ers motion dynamics and skeletal structures. The optimiza-
tion finds perturbations by balancing between classification
goals and perceptual distortions, formulated as classifica-
tion loss and perceptual loss. Varying the classification loss
leads to different attacking strategies. The new perceptual
loss fully utilizes the dynamics of the motions and bone
structures. We empirically show that SMART is effective
in both white-box and black-box settings, on several state-
of-the-art models, across a variety of datasets.
Formally, our contributions include:
• A novel perceptual loss function for adversarial attack
on action recognition based on 3D skeletal motions.
The new perceptual loss captures the perceptual real-
ism and fully exploits the motion dynamics.
• Empirical evidence that 3D skeletal motions are vul-
nerable to attack under multiple settings and attacking
strategies, by extensive experiments and user studies.
• Insights into the role of dynamics in the imperceptibil-
ity of adversarial attack based on comprehensive per-
ceptual studies. This result differs significantly from
widely accepted approaches, which use l-norm with -
ball constraints on static data such as images.
2. Related Work
2.1. Skeleton-based Action Recognition
Action recognition is crucial for many important ap-
plications, namely visual surveillance, human-robot inter-
action and entertainment. Recent advances in 3D sens-
ing and pose estimation motivate the use of clean skele-
ton data to robustly classify human actions, overcoming the
biases from raw RGB video due to body occlusion, scat-
tered background, lighting variation, etc. Unlike conven-
tional approaches that are limited to handcrafted skeletal
features [32, 5, 2], recent methods taking the advantage of
trained features from deep learning have gained the state-
of-the-art performance. According to the representation
of the skeleton data used for training, deep learning based
methods can be classified into three categories, including
sequence-based methods, image-based methods, and graph-
based methods, respectively.
Sequence-based methods represent skeleton data as a
chronological sequence of postures, each of which con-
sists of the coordinates of all the joints. Then RNN-
based architecture is employed to perform the classifica-
tion [3, 23, 17, 28, 46]. Image-based methods represent
skeletal motion as a pseudo-image, which is a 2D tensor
where one dimension corresponds to time, and the other di-
mension stacks all joints from a single skeleton. Such rep-
resentation enables CNN-based image classification to be
applied in the action recognition context [18, 10]. Different
from the previous two categories that mainly rely on skele-
ton geometry represented by the joint coordinates, graph-
based methods utilize graph representation to naturally con-
sider the skeleton topology (i.e., joint connectivity) encoded
by bones that connect neighboring joints. Graph neural
networks (GNN) are used to train the classifier and recog-
nize the action [42, 30, 26]. Based on the code released
by the original authors, we perform adversarial attacks on
two most representative categories (i.e., RNN- and GNN-
based), demonstrating the vulnerability of different types of
neural networks.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks
Despite its significance of enhancing vision-based tasks
such as classification and recognition, deep neutral net-
works are vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial attacks
as firstly pointed out in [29]. In other words, delicately de-
signed neural networks with high performance can be eas-
ily fooled by an unnoticeable perturbation on the original
data. With the above concern being addressed, researchers
have extensively investigated adversarial attacks on differ-
ent data types, including 2D images [6, 22, 19, 39, 41],
videos [37, 35], 3D shapes [15, 45, 40, 38], physical ob-
jects [12, 1, 4], while rare attention has been paid on 3D
skeletal motions.
Adversarial attacks in the context of action recognition is
much less explored. Inkawhich et al. [8] perform adversar-
ial attacks for optical-flow based action recognition classi-
fiers, which is mainly inspired from image classifier attacks
and differs from our work in terms of the input data.
In recent contemporaneous work to our own [16] , adver-
sarial attack is applied to a GNN network for action classi-
fication from skeletal motion [42]. The loss function used
for the attack minimises the acceleration of joint positions,
for which there is a qualitative demonstration of impercep-
tibility. In our work, we demonstrate improved results using
a perceptual loss that minimises acceleration relative to the
original skeletal motion, thereby preserving the large accel-
erations intrinsic to actions such as running and jumping.
We also perform a perceptual study to validate the imper-
ceptibility of the perturbed skeletal motions and the effec-
tiveness of our choice of perceptual loss.
We demonstrate successful attacks on a range of network
architectures, including RNN and GNN based methods, us-
ing three datasets. Finally, we present results for three dif-
ferent attack objectives, including the novel objective of
placing the correct action beneath the first n actions in a
ranked classification, for a given n.
3. Methodology
SMART is formulated as an optimization problem,
where the minimizer is an adversarial example, for a given
motion, that minimizes the perceptual distortion while fool-
ing the target model. The optimization has three vari-
ants constructed for three different attacking strategies:
Anything-but Attack, Anything-but-N Attack and Specified
Attack. They are used in white-box and black-box scenar-
ios.
3.1. Optimization for Attack
In an action recognition task, given a motion q = {q0,
q1, ... ,qt}, where qt is the frame at time t and consists of
stacked 3D joint locations, a trained classifier Φ can pre-
dict its class label yq = C(Φ(q)), where Φ is namely a deep
neural network and Φ(q) is the predicted distribution over
class labels. C is usually a softmax function and yq is the
predicted label. We aim to find a perturbed example, qˆ, for
q, such as yq 6= yqˆ .
Without any constraints, it is trivial to find qˆ. So nor-
mally, it requires that the difference between q and qˆ is not
perceptible. This can be formulated into a generic optimiza-
tion problem:
arg min
qˆ
L = arg min
qˆ
wLc(q, qˆ) + (1− w)Lp(q, qˆ) (1)
where Lc and Lp are classification loss and perceptual loss
respectively andw is a weight. We usew = 0.4. Intuitively,
there are two forces governing qˆ. Lc is the classification loss
where we can design different attacking strategies. Lp is the
perceptual loss which dictates that the qˆ should be visually
indistinguishable from q.
To optimize for qˆ, we have only one mild assumption: we
can compute the gradient: ∂L∂qˆ . This way, we can compute qˆ
iteratively by qˆt+1 = qˆt + f( ∂L∂qˆt , qˆt) where qˆt is qˆ at step t,
f computes the updates and  is the learning rate. We set qˆ0
= q and use Adam [11] for f .
3.2. Perceptual Loss
Imperceptibility is a hard constraint in adversarial at-
tacks. It requires that human cannot distinguish easily be-
tween the adversarial examples and real data. Many exist-
ing approaches on images and videos achieve impercepti-
bility by computing the image-wise or frame-wise minimal
changes, measured by a certain type of l norm, e.g. l1, l2 or
l∞. However, it would not work for motions because they
do not consider dynamics.
To fully represent the dynamics of a motion, we need
the derivatives from zero-order (joint location), first-order
(joint velocity) up to nth-order. One common approxima-
tion is to use first n terms, e.g. up to the second-order. When
it comes to imperceptibility on motions, the perceived mo-
tion naturalness is vital and not all derivatives are at the
same level of importance [33]. Inspired by the work in char-
acter animation [33, 34], we propose a new perceptual loss:
Lp(q, qˆ) = αldyn + (1− α)lbl (2)
lbl = ||Bl(q)−Bl(qˆ)||22 =
1
M
M∑
i=1
||Bl(qi)−Bl(qˆi)||22 (3)
ldyn =
∞∑
n=0
βn||γ(qn − qˆn)||22 where
∞∑
n=0
βn = 1 (4)
where α is a weight and set to 0.3 for our experiments.
lbl penalizes any bone length deviations in every frame
where M is the total frame number. Theoretically, the bone
lengths do not change over time. However, due to motion
capture errors, they do change in different frames even in
the original motions. This is why lbl is designed to be a
frame-wise bone length loss term.
ldyn is the dynamics loss. We use a strategy called
derivative matching. It is a weighted (by βn) sum of frame-
wise l2 distance between qn and qˆn, where qn and qˆn are
the nth-order derivatives and can be computed by forward
differencing. γ is a 25-dimensional vector of joint weights.
Although n goes up to infinity, in practice, we explored up
to n = 4, which includes joint position, velocity, accelera-
tion, jerk and snap. After exhaustive experiments, we found
that a good compromise is to set β0 = 0.6, β2 = 0.4 and the
rest to 0. Matching the 2nd-order profiles of two motions is
critical. For skeletal motions, small location deviations can
still generate large acceleration differences, resulting two
distinctive motions. More often, it generates severe jitter-
ing and thus totally unnatural motions. An alternative way
of regulating the dynamics is to purely smooth the motion,
by e.g. minimizing the acceleration. But it damps highly
dynamic motions such as jumping [33]. Also, considering
more derivatives makes the optimization harder to solve and
over-weighs their benefits.
Finally, we fix the values of γs. Based on our preliminary
studies, we found that the perceived motion naturalness is
not affected by all joint equally. The jittering on the torso
has higher impact. So we use higher weights on the spinal
joints. For all our experiments, the skeleton has 25 joints.
We use 0.04 for the 5 spinal joints and 0.02 for the rest.
3.3. White-box Attack
With the perceptual loss fixed, varying the formulation
of classification loss allows us to form different attacking
strategies. We present three strategies.
Anything-but Attack (AB). Anything-but Attack aims
to fool the classifier so that yq 6= yqˆ . This can be achieved
by maximizing the cross entropy between Φ(q) and Φ(qˆ):
Lc(q, qˆ) = −cross entropy(Φ(q),Φ(qˆ)) (5)
Comparatively, AB is the easiest optimization problem
among the three strategies. Φ(qˆ) could peak on any class
label but the ground-truth or even become just flat.
Anything-but-N Attack (ABN). Anything-but-N At-
tack is a generalization of AB. It aims to confuse the clas-
sifier so that it has similar confidence levels in multiple
classes. ABN is more suitable to confuse classifiers which
rely on top N accuracy. In addition, we found that it per-
forms better in black-box attacks by transferability, which
will be detailed in experiments.
Instead of simply using multiple AB for the top N
classes, we propose an easier loss function, maximizing the
entropy of the predicted distribution of qˆ:
Lc(q, qˆ) = −Entropy(Φ(qˆ)) (6)
yq 6∈ TopN(Φ(qˆ))
where TopN is the set of top n class labels in the predictive
distribution Φ(qˆ). By minimizing Lc, we actually maxi-
mize the entropy of Φ(qˆ), i.e. forcing it to be flat over all
class labels and thus reduce the confidence of the classifier
over any particular class. We stop the optimization once the
ground-truth label falls beyond the top n classes. ABN is a
harder optimization problem than AB because it needs the
predictive distribution to be as flat as possible.
3.3.1 Specified Attack (SA)
Different from AB and ABN, sometimes it is useful to fool
the classifier with a specific class label. Given a fake label
yqˆ , we can compute its corresponding class label distribu-
tion Φqˆ and minimize the cross entropy:
Lc(q, qˆ) = cross entropy(Φ(qˆ),Φqˆ) (7)
However, this is the most difficult scenario because it is
highly related to the similarity between the source and tar-
get labels. Turning a ‘clapping over the head’ motion into
a ‘raising two hands’ is easy and causes minimal visual
changes; while turning a ‘running’ motion into a ‘squat’
motion is impossible without noticeable visual changes.
3.4. Black-box Attack
Black-box attack assumes that any information about
the target classifier is not accessible. Under such circum-
stances, we use attack by transferability [31]. It begins with
training a surrogate classifier. Then adversarial examples
are computed by attacking the surrogate classifier. Finally,
the adversarial examples can be used to attack the target
classifier. In this paper, we do not construct our own surro-
gate model. Instead, we use an existing classifier as our sur-
rogate classifier to attack the others. In experiments, we at-
tack several state-of-the-art models. To test the transferabil-
ity and generalizability of our method, we use every model
in turns as the surrogate model and attack the others.
4. Experimental Results
We first introduce the datasets (Section 4.1) and mod-
els (Section 4.2) for our experiments. Then we present our
white-box (Section 4.3) and black-box (Section 4.4) attack
results. Finally, we present our perceptual studies on imper-
ceptibility (Section 4.5).
Since we attack multiple models on multiple datasets, we
first use the source code shared by the authors if available
or implement the models ourselves. Then we train them
strictly following the protocols in their papers. Next, we
test the models and collect the data samples that the trained
classifiers can successfully recognize, to create our adver-
sarial attack datasets. Finally, we compute the adversarial
samples using different attacking strategies.
4.1. Datasets
When choosing datasets, our criteria are: 1. It needs to
be widely used and contain 3D skeletal motions. 2. The
motion quality needs to be as high as possible because it is
tightly related to our perceptual study. Finally, we chose 3
benchmark datasets:
HDM05 dataset [20] is a 3D motion database captured
with an Mocap system. It contains 2337 sequences for 130
actions performed by 5 non-professional actors. The 3D
joint locations of the subjects are provided in each frame.
Berkeley MHAD dataset [21] is captured using a multi-
modal acquisition system. It consists of 11 actions per-
formed by 12 subjects, where 5 repetitions are performed
for each action, resulting in 659 sequences. In each frame
the 3D joint positions are extracted based on the 3D marker
trajectory.
NTU RGB+D dataset [24] is captured by Kinect v2 and
is currently one of the largest publicly available datasets for
3D action recognition. It is composed of more than 56,000
action sequences. A total of 60 action classes are performed
by 40 subjects. The videos are captured from 80 distinct
viewpoints. The 3D coordinates of joints are provided by
the Kinect data. Due to the huge number of samples and the
large intra-class and viewpoint variations, the NTU RGB+D
dataset is very challenging and is highly suitable to validate
the effectiveness and generalizability of our approach.
4.2. Target Models
We selected 5 state-of-the-art methods: HRNN [44], ST-
GCN [43], AS-GCN [13], DGNN [26] and 2s-AGCN [27].
They include both RNN- and GNN-based models. We im-
plemented HRNN following the paper and used the code
shared online for the rest four methods.
We also followed their protocols in data pre-processing.
Specifically, we preprocess the HDM05 dataset and Berke-
ley MHAD dataset as in [44], and the NTU RGB+D dataset
as in [27]. Their respective class numbers are 65, 11 and
Figure 1. Skeletal structure with 25 joints and their labels.
60. We also map different skeletons to a standard 25-joint
skeleton as in [33] (see Figure 1). Please refer to relevant
papers for details.
The five target models require different inputs, but they
can be easily unified. HRNN, ST-GCN and AS-GCN all
take joint positions in each frame as input. DGNN and 2s-
AGCN require joint positions and bones. Although bones
are taken as an independent input, they can be computed
from joint positions. So we add another input layer before
the original model to compute bones from joint positions.
As this layer is only for computing bones and introduce no
new variables, it does not change the behaviours of the orig-
inal models.
4.3. White-box Attack
In this section, we qualitatively and quantitatively evalu-
ate the performance of SMART on the aforementioned three
datasets. We use a learning rate between 0.005 and 0.0005
and a maximum of 300 iterations. The setting for AB and
ABN is straightforward. In SA, the number of experiments
needed will be prohibitively large if we attack every mo-
tion with every other label but the ground-truth. Instead, we
randomly select a fake label to attack. Since the number of
motions attacked is large, the results are adequately repre-
sentative. Note that this is a very strict test as most of the
motions are rather distinctive.
To perform the attack, we first train the target models
using the settings in the original papers to ensure similar
training results. We then test the models with the testing
dataset and record the motions that can be successfully rec-
ognized. Lastly, we attack these motions and record the
success rates. For simplicity, we only show representative
results in the paper. For more comprehensive results, please
refer to the supplementary material and video1.
4.3.1 Attack Results
We show the quantitative results of AB in Table 1. High suc-
cess rates are universally achieved across different datasets
1https://youtu.be/C1G1Ucz2gCI
and different target models, demonstrating the generaliz-
ability of SMART.
Model HDM05 MHAD NTU
HRNN 100 100 99.56
ST-GCN 99.57 99.96 100
AS-GCN 99.36 92.84 97.43
DGNN 96.09 94.46 92.51
2s-AGCN 99.18 95.97 100
mean 98.84 96.65 97.9
Table 1. Success rate of Anything-but (AB) Attack.
Figure 2. Normalized confusion matrix of 2s-AGCN on HDM05
(Left, 65 classes), MHAD (Middle, 11 classes) and NTU (Right,
60 classes). The darker the cell, the higher the value.
In addition, we show the normalized confusion matrices
of 2s-AGCN on all datasets using AB (Figure 2). High-
resolution results are in available the supplementary ma-
terial. In AB attack, we found that semantically simi-
lar motions can be easily confused, such as the grab mo-
tions (‘Grab XX’) vs. deposit motions (‘Deposit XX’) in
HDM05, ‘Jumping in place’ vs ‘Jumping jacks’ in MHD
and ‘wear a shoe’ vs ‘take off a shoe’ in NTU. Some of
them mainly differ in the temporal order, and some of them
mainly differ in spatial variations. These are classes that are
hard to distinguish in action recognition and are thus prone
to being attacked.
Next, we show the results of ABN in Table 2. As a gen-
eralization of AB, we show two variations: AB3 and AB5.
They are good for attacking classifiers based on top N ac-
curacy. Although the overall performance is still good, the
success rates are relatively lower compared with AB. It ver-
ifies our qualitative analysis in Section 3.3. ABN is harder
than AB. Also AB5 is harder than AB3. In addition, the re-
sults on MHAD is worse than the other two. This is because
there are only 11 classes as oppose to 65 and 60 in the other
two. Excluding the ground-truth label from the top 5 out of
11 classes is harder than that of 65 and 60 classes.
Next, Table 3 shows the results of SA, which are not so
good as AB or ABN. Again, this is consistent with our ex-
pectation on the difficulties of the tasks. SA is the most
difficult because randomly selected class labels often come
from significantly different action classes. Although it is
relatively easy to confuse the model between a deposit mo-
tion and a grab motion, it is extremely difficult to do so for a
jumping motion and a wear-a-shoe motion. However, even
Model (AB3/AB5) HDM05 MHAD NTU
HRNN 100/100 100/100 99.84/99.62
ST-GCN 93.30/90.28 76.86/70.5 95.86/91.32
AS-GCN 91.46/82.83 42.07/22.34 91.18/82.47
DGNN 93.55/86.32 87.54/74.27 98.73/97.62
2s-AGCN 83.40/75.2 55.9/32.08 100/100
mean 92.34/86.93 72.47/59.84 97.12/94.21
Table 2. Success rate of Anything-but-N Attack. The results are
when n = 3 (AB3) and 5 (AB5).
under such circumstances, SMART is still able to succeed
in more than 70% cases on average.
Model HDM05 MHAD NTU
HRNN 67.19 57.41 49.17
ST-GCN 74.95 66.93 100
AS-GCN 64.62 40.18 99.48
DGNN 97.26 96.13 99.99
2s-AGCN 96.72 97.53 100
mean 80.15 71.64 89.73
Table 3. Success rate of Specified Attack.
Finally, we also shows one motion in NTU attacked us-
ing three strategies in Figure 3.
Figure 3. AS-GCN on NTU. Four rows from top to bottom: Orig-
inal, AB, AB5 and SA. ‘brushing teeth’ is the ground-truth label.
4.3.2 Attack Behavioural Analysis
We also analyze the behaviour of SMART by looking at
which joint or joint groups are vulnerable. Initially, we
thought that if some joints tend to be attacked together, the
correlation between the displacements of these joints should
be high. So we compute the l2 norm of joint displacements
after the attack and their Pearson correlations. We show the
results of HDM05 and MHAD on 2SAGCN and DGNN re-
spectively using AB in Figure 4 Left. Although some local
high correlations between joint 2 and 3, 6 and 7, 9 and 10,
20 and 21 can be found, they are not universal. Please see
other results in the supplementary material. Then we tried
to find if across-joint correlations are action-dependent. But
no universal conclusion was found either.
Figure 4. Joint correlations: displacement-displacement (Left),
displacement-speed (Middle) and displacement-acceleration
(Right). The brighter the color is, the bigger the value is. Top:
2S-AGCN on HDM05. Bottom: DGNN on MHAD.
Finally, the displacement-speed and displacement-
acceleration correlations can give a consistent description
of SMART, shown in Figure 4 Middle and Right. The
correlations are computed between the joint displacements
and the original velocities and accelerations, respectively.
These two correlations reveal the behaviour of SMART: the
higher the speed/acceleration is, the more the joint is at-
tacked (shown by the high values along the main diagonal).
In addition, they also reveal some consistent across-joint
correlations (as shown by red squares). Note that the joints
in a red square belong to one part of the body (four limbs
and one trunk). Finally, this also suggests joints with high
velocity and acceleration are important features in the target
models because these joints are attacked the most.
4.4. Black-box Attack
In the black-box setting, we need a surrogate model to
fool target models. To this end, we use three models: AS-
GCN, DGNN and 2s-AGCN, and one dataset: NTU. This is
because these models are the latest state-of-the-art methods
and their original implementations are available online. In
addition, NTU dataset is the one used in all three papers.
To test the generalizability of SMART, we in turns take ev-
ery model as the surrogate model and produce adversarial
examples using AB and AB5. Then we use the adversarial
examples to attack the other two models. Results are shown
in Table 4.
Surrogate/Target/ DGNN 2s-AGCN AS-GCN
DGNN(AB/AB5) n/a 90.6(90.99) 7.24(7.63)
2s-AGCN(AB/AB5) 98.37(98.46) n/a 98.10(98.96)
AS-GCN(AB/AB5) 10.90(12.97) 91.17(91.99) n/a
Table 4. Success rate of black-box attack.
Firstly, AB5 results are in general better than AB. We
speculate that there are two factors. First, the predictive
class distribution of AB5 is likely to be flatter than AB. The
flatness improves the transferability because a target model
with similar decision boundaries will also produce a simi-
larly flat predictive distribution, and thus is more likely to
be fooled. Besides, since the ground-truth label is pushed
away from the top 5 classes in the surrogate model, it is also
likely to be far away from the top in the target model.
We also notice that the transferability is not universally
successful. DGNN and AS-GCN cannot easily fool one an-
other. Meanwhile, 2S-AGCN can fool and be fooled by
both of them. Since the transferability can be described by
distances between decision boundaries [31], our specula-
tion is that 2S-AGCN’s boundary structure overlaps with
both DGNN and AS-GCN significantly but the other two
overlap little. The theoretic reason is hard to identify, as the
formal analysis on transferability has just emerged on static
data [31, 47]. The theoretic analysis of time-series data is
beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore left for future
work.
4.5. Perceptual Study
Imperceptibility is a requirement for adversarial attack.
Although it is possible to do qualitative visual comparisons
on image-based attack, more rigorous evaluations need to
be done for more complex data [40]. This is especially the
case for motions which are time-series data.
To investigate the imperceptibility, we conducted three
user studies (Deceitfulness, Naturalness and Indistinguisha-
bility). Since our sample space is huge (5 models × 3
datasets × 3 attacking strategies), we chose the most repre-
sentative model and data. We chose 2S-AGCN as our model
because it is one of the latest state-of-the-art methods, with
AB as the attacking strategy. We use HDM05 and MHAD
datasets because NTU dataset has motion jittering and gen-
erally lower visual quality (see the video for details). In
total, we recruited 37 subjects (age between 18 and 37).
Deceitfulness. In each user study, we randomly chose
100 motions with the ground-truth and attacked label for
100 trials. In each trial, the video was played for 6 sec-
onds then the user was asked to choose which label best de-
scribes the motion with no time limit. This is to test whether
SMART visually changes the semantics of the motion.
Naturalness. Since unnatural motions can be easily
identified as the result of attack, we performed ablation tests
on different loss term combinations. We designed four set-
tings: l2, l2-acc, l2-bone, SMART. l2 is where only the l2
error of joint locations is used, l2-acc is l2 plus the accel-
eration profile loss, l2-bone is l2 plus the bone-length loss
and SMART is our proposed perceptual loss. We first show
qualitative comparisons in Figure 5. Video comparisons are
available in the supplementary video. Visually, SMART is
the best. Even from static postures, one can easily see the
artifacts caused by joint displacements. The spine joints are
the most obvious. The joint displacements causes unnatural
zig-zag bending in l2, l2-acc and l2-bone.
Figure 5. Visual ablation test between different loss terms.
Next, we conducted user studies. In each study, we ran-
domly selected 50 motions. For each motion, we made two
trials. The first includes one attacked motion by SMART
and one randomly selected from l2, l2-acc and l2-bone.
The second includes two motions randomly drawn from l2,
l2-acc and l2-bone. The first trial aims to evaluate our re-
sults again other alternatives and the second gives insights
to the impact of different perceptual loss terms. In each of
the 100 trials, two motions were played together for 6 sec-
onds twice, then the user was asked to choose which mo-
tion looks more natural or cannot tell the difference, with
no time limit.
Indistinguishability. In this study, we did a very strict
test to see if the users can tell if a motion is changed in any
way at all. In each experiment, 100 pairs of motions were
randomly selected. In each trial, the left motion is always
the original and the user is told so. The right one can be
the original (sensitivity) or attacked (perceivability). We
ask if the user can see any visual differences. Each video is
played for 6 seconds then the user was asked to choose if the
right motion is a changed version of the left, with no time
limit. This user study serves two purposes. Perceivability
is a direct test on Indistinguishability on the attack while
sensitivity is to screen out subjects who tend to give random
choices. Most users are able to recognize if two motions
are the same (close to 100% accuracy), but there are a few
whose choices are more random. We discard any user data
which falls below 80% accuracy on the sensitivity test.
4.5.1 Results
The success rate of Deceitfulness is 93.32% overall, which
means that most of the time SMART does not change the se-
mantics of the motions. When looking into the success rates
on different datasets, SMART achieved 86.77% on HDM05
and 96.38% on MHAD. So we looked into in what motions
SMART did change the visual meanings. We discovered
that the confusion was caused by the motion ambiguity in
the original data and labels. For instance, when a ’Hop-
ping’ motion is attacked into a ’Jumping’ motion, some
users chose ’Jumping’. Similar situations occur for ’Waving
one hand’ with ’Throwing a ball’, ’Walking forward’ with
’Walking LC’. All these motions have small spatial varia-
tions and do not distinguish well.
Next, Figure 6 shows the results of Naturalness. Users’
preferences over different losses are SMART > l2-acc >
l2 > l2-bone. SMART leads to the most natural results as
expected.
Dynamics in Imperceptibility. To investigate the benefits
of exploiting dynamics compared to joint-only perturbation,
we did further analysis on SMART-vs-l2 where users chose
SMART over l2. We first compute their respective joint-
wise deviations from the original motions, shown in Figure
7. In general, the perturbations of SMART is in general
higher than l2 and have larger standard deviations. How-
ever, the users still chose SMART over l2. It indicates that
with proper exploitation of dynamics, larger joint deviations
Figure 6. Normalized user preferences on Naturalness. our:
SMART. bone: l2-bone. acc: l2-acc. The vertical axis is the per-
centage of user preference on a particular loss
can generate even more desirable results. This is signifi-
cantly different from the static data (e.g. images), where
it is believed that l-norms are tightly tied to imperceptibil-
ity [7] (under a -ball constraints).
Finally, we did the Indistinguishability test. The fi-
nal results are 81.9% on average, 80.83% on HDM05 and
83.97% on MHAD. Note that this is a side-by-side com-
parison and thus is very harsh on SMART. The users were
asked to find any visual differences they could. To avoid
situations where motions are too fast to spot any differences
(e.g. kicking and jumping motions), we also played the mo-
tions three times slower than the original. Even under such
harsh tests, SMART is still able to fool humans most of the
time.
5. Discussion
Imperceptibility is vital in adversarial attack. When it
comes to skeletal motions, perceptual studies are essential
because existing metrics (e.g. l-norm) cannot fully reflect
perceived realism/naturalness/quality. In addition, it helps
us to uncover a unique feature of attacking skeletal motions.
Losses solely based on joint location deviations are often
overly conservative. It is understandable because they are
mainly used for static data and thus are not able to fully
utilize the dynamics.
Next, forming the joint deviation as a hard con-
straint [16] is not the best strategy in our problem. First,
a threshold needs to be given and it is unclear how to set
it. Second, restricting joint deviation implies that it is solely
the most important factor on imperceptibility. Our percep-
tual study shows that larger joint deviations can be used if
the dynamics are exploited properly.
Lastly, we could also use joint angles as representations.
However, in practice, we find that perturbing joint angles
causes jittering and makes the system hard to optimize, sim-
ilar to [33].
Figure 7. The mean (Top) and standard deviation (Bottom) of the
joint-wise deviations of SMART and l2.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a method, SMART, to attack
action recognizers based on 3D skeletal motions. Through
comprehensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations, we
show that SMART is general across multiple state-of-the-
art models on various benchmark datasets. Moreover,
SMART is versatile as it can delivery both white-box and
black-box attacks with multiple attacking strategies. Fi-
nally, SMART is deceitful verified in extensive perceptual
studies. We hope that this work will lead to further inves-
tigation and counter measures to improve the robustness of
action recognizers in the future.
In the future, we would like to theoretically investigate
why the transferability varies between different models un-
der black-box attack. Although there has been research on
static data, dynamic data is still not investigated. It involves
testing more target models and developing a method to de-
scribe the structures of class boundaries. We will also in-
vestigate on what attack is in people’s blind regions. Our
experiments indicate that there might be a blind-region sub-
space of motions where changes are not perceivable to hu-
mans. Adversarial attacks in this sub-space would lead to
better results regarding human perception.
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